ESLaPorte
2004-04-03 14:16:19 UTC
Along the same lines as a privous post, the currently, the only "mandate"
that can cause deployment of a NATO force, say the NRF, is consensus of the
North Atlantic Council, aka, NAC. Then, operational plans are drawn up by
the NATO military authorities (NMA's). Also, since the threat to NATO
Allies is from terrorism, not the "Soviet Russians," the need for a "no
fuss, no muss" decision-making process is needed for our NATO Alliance.
"Intelligent replys only, please!"
Say, in a hypothetical situation, the Spanish government felt threatened by
the presence of al-Qaeda cells in Morocco and felt that its security was
seriously threatened that it needed NATO help. After the bombings in Madrid,
this could be the case. The Spanish then wanted its PermRep (permanent
represenative, or ambassador) at NATO to invoke Article Four in the NAC, as
the presence of al-Qaeda cells in Morocco need attention of the NRF to
prevent another March 11, 2004 from occuring.
There are several questions and problems with this Article Four situation as
the decision making process is in NATO currently:
First, not all nations of NATO (now 26) would agree that there is really a
threat to Spain, and this could be the case with some Allies that are a bit
sqimish with the notion of invading another country.
Second, as mentioned above, there could be questions as to the political
ramifications of invading another nation with NATO forces. Some Allies would
want more diplomacy with Morocco and getting the UN Security Council
involved, and this could be the case with Western European Allies. NATO's
non-military function as a diplomatic organization could be used...
Third, those nations that object may have forces deployed as the current
rotation in the NRF, and may not want them taking part in such an action.
This includes domestic political considerations.
The result of this kind of situation could be actually worse than what we
saw in Feburary 2003 in the pre-Iraq War, political climate and the
perceived threat to Turkey from Hussein's scud missiles.
Both Ira Straus and Leo Michel, espically Leo Michel, discuss various
decision makng models. These have been copied and pasted from my current
paper on the NATO decision-making topic:
Option one, the "Threatened Ally rule," would allow an Ally that invokes
Article Four or otherwise feels threatened, to request that the NATO
military authorities (NMA's) prepare contingency operational plans and the
request would be approved by the Council, unless a consensus of Allies
object to the plans. This procedure is reverse of what is current practice
between the NMAs and the Council, whereby the NMAs prepare operational plans
for which the political guidance is provided by the Council. The burden of
proof would shift from the threatened Ally to the non-threatened Allies that
object to request for contingency operational plans.
The second option, dubbed "SACEUR's discretion," would allow the Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) to be granted authority by the Council to
create contingency operational plans for a wide range of NATO missions. The
SACEUR would keep the Military Committee and the Secretary General informed
of the progress of the plans. This option could employ Secretary General
feedback on the "sense of the Council" without formal Council decision on
plans. This model was used during the 1999 Kosovo crisis by Javier Solana.
The third option would avoid the "war by committee" image that the Alliance
cultivated in the 1999 Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. In the "empowered
coalitions within NATO" option, the Council would create a "NATO committee
of contributors," NCC, which would be comprised of Allies willing to
contribute to an operation and could draw on NATO assets in non-Article Five
crisis missions. The NCC would decide on rules of engagement and other steps
to implement the operation. The NCC would be composed of those Allies that
agree on the common threat, while those Allies that do not agree on the
threat will not be able to hinder others from participating in the
operation.
The fourth option would involve some sort of voting system with an opt-out
for those member states that do not wish to participate in a NATO mission.
There could be some variations of the above. All would allow the Alliance
some flexibility to make a meaningful decision. Leo Michel is still a
believer in the consensus rule, but Straus believes that the consensus rule
is an out-dated, Cold War practice that has little place in the newly
transformed, post-Cold War NATO. This Author feels that consensus and
solidarity were fine for the static "Soviet Russians" threat. Now that the
Cold War is over and in the dynamic, fluid threats from terrorism, NATO
could not only be left out again...but suffer another embarrassing fight in
the NAC.
"The Prague Summit one year on: the NRF, NATO's transformation and
decision-making process."
http://terrorism.pronato.com/NATO.NRF.terrorism.htm
Enjoy friends!
Erin LaPorte
The NATO Citizen - www.pronato.com
"Long live the entangling Alliance!"
"Long live NATO!"
that can cause deployment of a NATO force, say the NRF, is consensus of the
North Atlantic Council, aka, NAC. Then, operational plans are drawn up by
the NATO military authorities (NMA's). Also, since the threat to NATO
Allies is from terrorism, not the "Soviet Russians," the need for a "no
fuss, no muss" decision-making process is needed for our NATO Alliance.
"Intelligent replys only, please!"
Say, in a hypothetical situation, the Spanish government felt threatened by
the presence of al-Qaeda cells in Morocco and felt that its security was
seriously threatened that it needed NATO help. After the bombings in Madrid,
this could be the case. The Spanish then wanted its PermRep (permanent
represenative, or ambassador) at NATO to invoke Article Four in the NAC, as
the presence of al-Qaeda cells in Morocco need attention of the NRF to
prevent another March 11, 2004 from occuring.
There are several questions and problems with this Article Four situation as
the decision making process is in NATO currently:
First, not all nations of NATO (now 26) would agree that there is really a
threat to Spain, and this could be the case with some Allies that are a bit
sqimish with the notion of invading another country.
Second, as mentioned above, there could be questions as to the political
ramifications of invading another nation with NATO forces. Some Allies would
want more diplomacy with Morocco and getting the UN Security Council
involved, and this could be the case with Western European Allies. NATO's
non-military function as a diplomatic organization could be used...
Third, those nations that object may have forces deployed as the current
rotation in the NRF, and may not want them taking part in such an action.
This includes domestic political considerations.
The result of this kind of situation could be actually worse than what we
saw in Feburary 2003 in the pre-Iraq War, political climate and the
perceived threat to Turkey from Hussein's scud missiles.
Both Ira Straus and Leo Michel, espically Leo Michel, discuss various
decision makng models. These have been copied and pasted from my current
paper on the NATO decision-making topic:
Option one, the "Threatened Ally rule," would allow an Ally that invokes
Article Four or otherwise feels threatened, to request that the NATO
military authorities (NMA's) prepare contingency operational plans and the
request would be approved by the Council, unless a consensus of Allies
object to the plans. This procedure is reverse of what is current practice
between the NMAs and the Council, whereby the NMAs prepare operational plans
for which the political guidance is provided by the Council. The burden of
proof would shift from the threatened Ally to the non-threatened Allies that
object to request for contingency operational plans.
The second option, dubbed "SACEUR's discretion," would allow the Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) to be granted authority by the Council to
create contingency operational plans for a wide range of NATO missions. The
SACEUR would keep the Military Committee and the Secretary General informed
of the progress of the plans. This option could employ Secretary General
feedback on the "sense of the Council" without formal Council decision on
plans. This model was used during the 1999 Kosovo crisis by Javier Solana.
The third option would avoid the "war by committee" image that the Alliance
cultivated in the 1999 Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. In the "empowered
coalitions within NATO" option, the Council would create a "NATO committee
of contributors," NCC, which would be comprised of Allies willing to
contribute to an operation and could draw on NATO assets in non-Article Five
crisis missions. The NCC would decide on rules of engagement and other steps
to implement the operation. The NCC would be composed of those Allies that
agree on the common threat, while those Allies that do not agree on the
threat will not be able to hinder others from participating in the
operation.
The fourth option would involve some sort of voting system with an opt-out
for those member states that do not wish to participate in a NATO mission.
There could be some variations of the above. All would allow the Alliance
some flexibility to make a meaningful decision. Leo Michel is still a
believer in the consensus rule, but Straus believes that the consensus rule
is an out-dated, Cold War practice that has little place in the newly
transformed, post-Cold War NATO. This Author feels that consensus and
solidarity were fine for the static "Soviet Russians" threat. Now that the
Cold War is over and in the dynamic, fluid threats from terrorism, NATO
could not only be left out again...but suffer another embarrassing fight in
the NAC.
"The Prague Summit one year on: the NRF, NATO's transformation and
decision-making process."
http://terrorism.pronato.com/NATO.NRF.terrorism.htm
Enjoy friends!
Erin LaPorte
The NATO Citizen - www.pronato.com
"Long live the entangling Alliance!"
"Long live NATO!"